Bava Basra is full of the laws relating to property and rights of ownership. On this page, the Talmud addresses a case in which two people claim ownership of a property, but neither has evidence nor presumptive ownership. What should be done? Rav Nachman offers an answer, which is not really an answer at all.
בבא בתרא לד, ב
זֶה אוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁל אֲבוֹתַי״, וְזֶה אוֹמֵר: ״שֶׁל אֲבוֹתַי״ – אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: כֹּל דְּאַלִּים גָּבַר
There was an incident where two people dispute the ownership of property. This one says: It belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them, and that one says: It belonged to my ancestors and I inherited it from them. Rav Nachman said: Whoever is stronger prevails.
Last week, on the way into shul, I asked a friend how he translated כֹּל דְּאַלִּים גָּבַר. His answer: “The law of the Jungle.” As we shall see, that’s a pretty good translation, but this is of course entirely unsatisfactory from a legal perspective. Didn’t we learn in kindergarten that might does not make right?? How might we understand Rav Nachman’s rather unfair ruling?
For some help, let’s turn to Joseph David’s 2006 paper The One Who Is More Violent Prevails- Law and Violence from a Talmudic Legal Perspective, published in the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence.
The Duel and the Ordeal
He begins by pointing out that in many societies, the duel was recognized as a legal procedure. It probably began with “Germanic tribes, the Celts and the Francs in the early medieval period, from which point it was extended to the entire continent during mid and late medieval period.” Why would a duel be seen as a fair way to settle a legal dispute? Becuase, argues David, the outcome of the duel was seen as divinely adjudicated. It was judicium De, “for the deity's power was understood not only as a metaphysical feature, but rather as expressed through interventions applying law and justice in earthly life.” It was this belief that led to the trial by ordeal (think Parshat Sotah).
The similarity of the duel and the ordeal is not coincidental, and their justification mechanism makes them similar legal procedures. The duel as well as the ordeal placed the accused before a real danger whose outcome signified innocence or guilt, and in both procedures, the results were considered the deity's verdict. Therefore victory in duel, and survival of an ordeal, were interpreted as indication of heavenly adjudication and not as an arbitrary result.
“ From a judicial standpoint, the mechanism legitimizing the duel as a legal procedure in effect expresses a way of dealing with the phenomenon of legal uncertainty, and a perspective that views its existence as a moment in which the case exceeds the bounds of the law and is transferred for adjudication via an alternative procedure.”
So when ordinary law has reached an impasse, heavenly law takes over. And there are many cases in the Talmud when a person is exempt from human judgment but liable to heavenly judgment - “ פָּטוּר מִדִּינֵי אָדָם, וְחַיָּיב בְּדִינֵי שָׁמַיִם.”
“בּוֹר שֶׁהוּא קָרוֹב לָאַמָּה וְכוּ׳: אִיתְּמַר: בְּנֵי נַהֲרָא; רַב אָמַר: תַּתָּאֵי שָׁתוּ מַיָּא בְּרֵישָׁא, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אֲמַר: עִילָּאֵי שָׁתוּ מַיָּא בְּרֵישָׁא
The mishna teaches that the Sages enacted that the pit that is nearest to the irrigation channel that supplies water to several pits or fields is filled first on account of the ways of peace. It was stated that the amora’im disagree about the following issue: When people own fields along a river and they irrigate their fields with water that is redirected from it, who among them enjoys first rights to irrigate his field? Rav said: The owners of the lowermost fields drink the water, i.e., irrigate their fields, first. And Shmuel said: The owners of the uppermost fields drink the water first
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא: הַשְׁתָּא דְּלָא אִיתְּמַר הִלְכְתָא לָא כְּמָר וְלָא כְּמָר, כֹּל דְּאַלִּים גָּבַר
Rav Huna bar Taḥalifa said: Now that the halakha was stated neither in accordance with the opinion of this Sage, Rav, nor in accordance with the opinion of that Sage, Shmuel, whoever is stronger prevails...”
The MEdieval Commentaries
Although the legal verdict of כל דאלים גבר appears rarely in the Talmud, it is more fully explained in the later commentators. “Rabbenu Chananel (d. c. 1056, cited in חדושי הרמבן על ש׳ס, בבא מציעא 2א ) distinguished between two distinct situations of conflicting claims of full ownership in which court is helpless-a situation where the conflicting sides both occupy the subject and thus leaving it in their hands means encouraging the violent and aggressive struggle between the two, and a situation where they do not have any possession and so their conflict bears a more competitive character….R. Hananel is limited only to struggles classified as fair competition and not for a state-of-affairs where the point of departure-'they are both occupying it'-invites aggression.”
Rabbenu Asher ben Yechiel (c.1250-1327) known as the Rosh took the opposite approach. He believes that is means the status quo is kept. Whoever is in possession at the time of the dispute keeps the property - his claim is “stronger.” כל דאלים גבר is “a quasi- temporal means of determining possession until relevant proofs are brought to court and the case is solved according to ordinary evidential procedures.” His position is a reflection of the commentaries on the Talmud that “seek to rationalize כל דאלים גבר as a norm that is not an alternative to the law, threatening its power and authority, but rather ultimately, one that contributes to the preservation of its status and to the strengthening of its authority.” In the end, it prevents the court from making a potentially erroneous judgement, and endangering its reputation when it would have to reverse its ruling should later evidence be discovered.
זה אומר של אבותי וזה אומר של אבותי אמר רב נחמן כל דאלים גבר. האי כל דאלים גבר דינא הוא דכל מי שגבר ידו בפעם ראשונה הוא שלו עד שיביא חבירו ראיה וכל זמן שלא יביא ראיה
In contrast, Maimonides rules that it is a question of physical strength;
משנה תורה, הלכות טוען ונטען ט״ו:ד׳
שְׁנַיִם שֶׁהָיוּ עוֹרְרִין עַל הַשָּׂדֶה זֶה אוֹמֵר שֶׁלִּי וְזֶה אוֹמֵר שֶׁלִּי וְאֵין לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן רְאָיָה. אוֹ שֶׁהֵבִיא כָּל אֶחָד מֵהֶם עֵדִים שֶׁהִיא שֶׁלּוֹ אוֹ שֶׁל אֲבוֹתָיו אוֹ שֶׁהֵבִיא כָּל אֶחָד מִשְּׁנֵיהֶם עֵדִים שֶׁאֲכָלָהּ שְׁנֵי חֲזָקָה וְהַשָּׁנִים שֶׁהֵעִידוּ בָּהֶן אֵלּוּ הֵן הַשָּׁנִים עַצְמָן שֶׁהֵעִידוּ בָּהֶן אֵלּוּ. מַנִּיחִין אוֹתָהּ בִּידֵיהֶן וְכָל הַמִּתְגַּבֵּר יֵרֵד בָּהּ וְיִהְיֶה הָאַחֵר מוֹצִיא מִיָּדוֹ וְעָלָיו הָרְאָיָה. וְאִם בָּא שְׁלִישִׁי וְתָקַף עֲלֵיהֶן וְיָרַד לְתוֹכָהּ מְסַלְּקִין אוֹתוֹ מִמֶּנָּה
The following laws apply when two people are disputing the ownership of a field, each claiming it to be his own, but neither has proof of his claim. These same laws apply when both claimants bring witnesses who testify that the field belongs to them or to their parents, or when each of them brings witnesses who testify that the claimants benefited from the field for the time necessary to establish a claim of ownership, and both pairs of witnesses testify about exactly the same time period. We leave the field in their hands, and whoever overcomes the other one assumes possession…
And the Shulchan Aruch takes a similar approach:
שולחן ערוך, חושן משפט קמ״ו:כ״ב
ב' שהיו עוררים על שדה זה אומר שלי וזה אומר שלי ואין לאחד מהם ראיה או שהביא כל אחד מהם עדים שהוא שלו או של אבותיו או שהביא כל א' משניהם עדים שאכלה שני חזקה והשנים שהעידו בהם אלו הם השנים עצמם שהעידו בהם אלו אם היה א' מחזיק בה מקודם תשאר בידו ואם לא היה אחד מחזיק בה מניחין אותה בידיהם על המתגבר וכל המתגבר ירד בה ויהיה האחד מוציא מידו ועליו הראיה ואם בא שלישי ותקף עליהם וירד לתוכה מסלקין אותו ממנה:
The late Rabbi Adin Steinzaltz agrees. whoever has the muscle to take (and keep) the property becomes the legal owner:
כל דאלים גבר [החזק יגבר] ויקח, שאין בית הדין מתערב בענין זה
Saving the Court from Error
In the sixteenth century commentaries collected by Bezalel Ashkenazi (c. 1520–1591) known as the Shittah Mekubetzet, we find an new idea: כל דאלים גבר is a means of protecting the reputation of the court:
שהטעם שאמר כל דאלים גבר מפני שאין בית דין זקוקים ליזקק לדינם כיון דליכא דררא דממונא לתרווייהו וליכא למיקם עלה דמילתא וכיון שכן נוח להניחם לעשות כרצונם ולא נעשה אנו דין שיכול לבוא לידי טעות הילכך כל מי שמתגבר ידו בכל פעם הרי היא ברשותו עד שתגבר יד האחד או בזרוע או בראיה
The reason for the ruling כל דאלים גבר is that the court is not required to address their case for there is no loss of money for both of them and no urge to reach a decision. Accordingly it is comfortable to leave them to do what they wish and we should not give an erroneous verdict. Therefore the one who is more violent each time owns it, until the other one will overpower him, either by arm or by evidence.
There is much subtlety to David’s discussion, and much more to be said on the topic. His observation as כל דאלים גבר as a means of preserving the reputation of the court is fascinating. But it raises many further questions - why is this need manifest in so few cases? As usual, צריך עיון גדול.
